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Adrienne Héritier, Catherine Moury and Katarzyna Granat 
The Contest for Power in Delegated Rule-Making  
Ever since the Lisbon Treaty introduced the new provisions on delegated rule-making under 
Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, the newly created institutional rules have undergone change. 
Some of the changes have occurred openly in the formal political arenas, and have been 
contested by the relevant actors, i.e. Council, European Parliament (EP) and Commission. By 
contrast, other changes have occurred in a more covert or invisible way, unfolding after the 
adoption of a formal rule in the course of its application, and may therefore be formalized at a 
later stage. We are focusing on the latter type of institutional change and its consequences 
and ask ‘Under what circumstances does ‘interstitial’ institutional change occur, what are its 
dynamics and its consequences?’ 
1 The theoretical argument  
Building on Farrell and Héritier
1
 and Héritier,
2
 we define interstitial institutional change as 
informal institutional change which occurs between two formal rule revisions. For example, 
at time t1 a committee may initially formally agree that all of its decisions will be made by a 
unanimous vote; progressively, and informally, it may then accept some delegation of 
decision-making powers to individual members; and finally, and formally, at time t2 it may 
reconvene to discuss the decision-making rule it will follow. Interstitial institutional change is 
the second step in that sequence, i.e. the informal step taken between t1 and t2. Clearly, what 
happens then may have an important impact on the decision at t2. The study of this type of 
institutional change is therefore relevant from a theoretical point of view because it informs 
the burgeoning literature on the nature of institutions and the conditions for institutional 
change. In addition, it is topical from a societal/democratic stance because, if interstitial 
institutional change carries the promise of flexibility and efficiency, it may also lead to severe 
limitations in the operation of formal checks and balances.     
Our argument in this paper is that interstitial institutional changes are happening as a result of 
the application of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. We build on the theory of continuous 
institutional change in order to capture interstitial institutional change.
3
 It emphasizes the 
renegotiation or re-interpretation of incomplete institutional rules and policies. Institutional 
change emerges once a formal political decision of integration has been taken and this 
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decision constitutes an incomplete contract. This offers the possibility of it being renegotiated 
and specified in the course of its application. The explanation is based on the assumptions of 
goal-oriented, boundedly rational actors, seeking to maximize their institutional power and 
thereby their power over policy outcomes. Answers to why patterns of deepening integration 
appear may be derived from the pressure of external problem, specific institutional conditions 
and the relative bargaining power of the actors involved when redefining incomplete 
institutional or policy rules.  
Given problem pressure and a demand for coordinated policies - it is crucial whether 
decisions to coordinate at the higher level represent complete or incomplete contracts. If 
actors have similar preferences and agree on a detailed decision to upload competences to the 
higher level which also clearly circumscribes the power given to supranational actors, a 
limited transfer of powers has occurred in a complete contract and in an overt way in the 
main political arena. If, by contrast, member states have diverse preferences on the desired 
policy solutions and appropriate limits of supranational power, the outcome of the decision 
process in the main arena is likely to be vaguely formulated (an incomplete contract) and/or 
at the lowest common denominator. An incomplete contract – for strategic reasons and 
reasons of substantive uncertainty
4– leaves many details to be specified, and thereby opens 
the door for subsequent institutional and policy changes.
5
 These changes often happen 
outside the formal political arena. The renegotiation may give rise to informal rules on the 
handling of powers emerging alongside the formal political arena. The outcome of the 
implicit re-bargaining of the incomplete contract will be determined by the most powerful 
actors (as defined by their fall-back position), the existing decision-making rule and 
exogenous events. When specifying the incomplete contract, supranational executive actors 
may form an alliance with judicial actors in interpreting the details of the contract and – 
through court rulings - make an inroad into competences previously not formally mandated.  
In short, a deepening integration may result from the fact that – given external pressure - 
diverging preferences and consensus or unanimity rules make the formal political decision-
makers commit themselves to only vaguely formulated institutional rules or policy goals. 
Given the ambiguity of the rule or policy mandate, implementing actors, i.e. executive actors, 
and judicial actors, as well as political actors at the national level, are able to redefine the 
generally stated goal. Depending on the preferences and the relative power of the actors 
involved in the re-negotiation of the incomplete contract and given institutional restrictions, 
deepening integration may ensue.
6
 This leads to the conjecture that  
 “An incomplete institutional rule or policy may lead to an institutional change in the course 
of its application. In the renegotiation of the incomplete institutional rule, the preferences of 
the most powerful actors will be reflected in the substance of the modified institutional rule.”  
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2 Incomplete institutional rules: Articles 290 and 291 TFEU 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU, 2012) distinguishes between 
legislative delegation and executive delegation for the first time, and provides for two 
separate procedures for “delegated acts” and “implementing acts”.7 Under Article 290 TFEU, 
the Commission – by legislation – may be delegated the power to adopt “delegated acts” of 
general scope supplementing or amending certain non-essential elements of the legislation in 
question. The legislators must explicitly define the objective, content, scope and duration of 
this delegation. They also can choose the mechanism(s) used to control the Commission 
when it applies these delegated powers, revocation and objection. In the case of revocation, 
either the Council or the Parliament may revoke a delegation. Similarly, an objection on the 
part of either the Council or the Parliament would prevent an individual “delegated act” from 
entering into force.
8
   
The new provisions of the Lisbon Treaty leave open many questions as to how delegated acts 
(Article 290 TFEU) and implementing acts (Article 291 TFEU) should be applied. In other 
words, the provisions constitute an incomplete contract. We assume that actors seek to take 
full advantage of their institutional power in order to maximize their influence over policy 
outcomes; we further assume the following meta preferences of the institutional actors 
involved: the Commission will in general prefer extensive delegation over delegation with 
minimal or no control by member states and the EP. The EP will prefer legislation over 
delegation because it can wield more influence than under delegation (in particular in the case 
of implementing acts); if delegation has been chosen, it is assumed to prefer delegated acts 
over implementing acts. The Council will generally prefer delegation over legislation under 
co-decision since it has to share power with the EP under co-decision; if delegation has been 
chosen, it will prefer implementing acts over delegated acts because it does not have to share 
power with the EP and member states can still wield influence in the committees under 
implementing acts. From these assumed preferences we conclude that when the Commission 
proposes a “delegated act”, as a rule a conflict ensues between the Parliament, the Council 
and the Commission. The Council seeks to oppose it entirely or to reduce its scope, or to 
translate it into an implementing act. The EP will welcome the use of a delegated act and 
conversely oppose the use of implementing acts. Given these conflicts
9
 frequently, in order to 
come to an agreement packages are struck across various issues as to whether to use 
“delegating” or implementing acts.10  
Hence the guiding question we pose when scrutinizing four empirical cases is: How were the 
institutional rules on the application of delegated and implementing acts interpreted and 
renegotiated in these specific cases? Which issues were at stake and how were they resolved?  
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Methodologically, the four cases discussed do not claim to conduct a systematic empirical 
scrutiny but only seek to probe the plausibility of our general argument: “An incomplete 
institutional rule may lead to an interstitial institutional change in the course of its 
application. In the renegotiation of the incomplete institutional rule, the preferences of the 
most powerful actors will be reflected in the substance of the new modified institutional 
rule.” The first part of the empirical analysis will focus on the strategic interaction between 
the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament (EP) in renegotiating the 
ambiguous institutional rules governing delegation under the Lisbon Treaty. In the second 
part, an additional institutional player, the national parliaments, enters the stage to renegotiate 
the ambiguous institutional rules about how to apply delegated and implementing acts under 
the Lisbon Treaty.  
3. Empirical cases 
 
3.1. The contest of power between the Commission, the Council and the EP 
 
Case 1: The Regulation on the Prevention and Correction of Macroeconomic Imbalances 
 
The first case focuses on the conflict between the Commission, the Council and the EP in the 
definition of the economic indicators under the scoreboard regime as part of the preventive 
arm of the Prevention and Correction of Macroeconomic Imbalances.
11
 The conflict over the 
interpretation of the legal rules when deciding how to flesh out the scoreboard regime, i.e. the 
indicators used to measure and monitor macroeconomic and macrofinancial imbalances, gave 
rise a new informal rule (set out in the recital of the regulation and not in the legal text), about 
how to specify the formal rule which, however, due to the political importance, became de 
facto binding.  
Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure is based on two legislative acts.
12
 One regulation 
defines the details of the new surveillance procedure and covers all member states. Another 
regulation, which introduces an enforcement mechanism and possible sanctions, is only 
applicable to the members of the euro area. Under the new surveillance procedure for the 
identification of possible imbalances, a two-step approach has been established. An alert 
mechanism seeks to provide early warning of signs in some member states of macroeconomic 
imbalances which require in-depth investigation. “The objective is to identify 
macroeconomic imbalances at the early stage of their emergence so that necessary policy 
actions can be taken in due time and thus prevent the development of severe imbalances 
which are damaging for the Member State concerned and risk jeopardising the functioning of 
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 Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 
2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances.  Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive 
macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area 
the euro area.”13 The alert mechanism serves as an instrument of scrutiny, as a first step 
before a more in-depth inquiry which may then be followed by concrete policy 
recommendations. 
More specifically, the alert mechanism provides for a scoreboard based on indicators 
complemented by an economic reading thereof presented in an annual Alert Mechanism 
Report (AMR). The economic reading of the scoreboard indicators implies that there is no 
automaticity involved and that other relevant information can be taken into account. The 
indicators in the scoreboard focus on the most relevant dimensions of macroeconomic 
imbalances and losses of competitiveness, with particular focus on the smooth functioning of 
the euro area. “For this reason, the scoreboard consists of indicators which can monitor 
external balances, competitiveness positions and internal imbalances, and encompass 
variables where both the economic literature and recent experiences suggest associations with 
economic crises.”14 A wide range of policies are included when addressing the issue of 
imbalances, including fiscal policies, financial market regulation or structural reforms. The 
latter are meant to increase the flexibility of product and labormarkets, facilitating 
adjustments through changes in relative prices and wages together with the reallocation of 
labor and capital in the economy.
15
 
 
The results of the Alert Mechanism Report are discussed in the Council and Euro Group and, 
if deemed necessary, the Commission is empowered to decide which countries require in-
depth reviews. If a review reveals a macroeconomic imbalance, the Commission will propose 
policy recommendations for the member state in question. In the preventive arm, these 
proposals are part of the recommendations under the European semester. If the Commission 
comes to the conclusion that there are severe imbalances, it will recommend an excessive 
imbalances procedure to the Council; this is part of the corrective arm of the new procedure.
16
 
 
Some vague provisions were introduced in the Regulation on the Prevention and Correction 
of Macroeconomic Imbalances that needed specification through delegated legislation. In the 
interpretation of these incomplete institutional rules, a conflict emerged over the choice of 
either delegated acts (Article 290 TFEU) or implementing acts (Article 291 TFEU). When 
deciding how to flesh out the scoreboard regime, i.e. the indicators used to measure and 
monitor macroeconomic and macrofinancial imbalances, the Commission first proposed to 
define these indicators on its own. Following resistance from both the Council and the EP, 
the Commission and the EP proposed “delegated acts” (Article 290 TFEU) whilst the Council 
wished to use an implementing act (Article 291 TFEU). A deadlock ensued and after a round 
of negotiations this led to the use of an informal new type of procedure which is neither 
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16
 Ibid at 26. 
Article 290 TFEU nor Article 291 TFEU, the “compromise”. The respective recital 12 of the 
Regulation says  
“The Commission should closely cooperate with the European Parliament and the Council 
when drawing up the scoreboard and the set of macroeconomic and macrofinancial 
indicators for Member States. The Commission should present suggestions for comments to 
the competent committees of the European Parliament and of the Council on plans to 
establish and adjust the indicators and threshold. The Commission should inform the 
European Parliament and the Council of any changes to the indicators and threshold and 
explain its reasons for suggesting such changes.”  
 
Note the difference to the “real” use of a delegated act used in another six-pack regulation on 
the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area.
17
 As prescribed in the 
Comitology Regulation of 2010, it states that the Commission shall be empowered to adopt 
“delegated acts” regarding the criteria establishing fines, procedures for investigations 
(Article 8.4); that the Commission shall draw up a report in respect of the delegation of 
power; and that the delegation may be revoked at any time by the Parliament or by the 
Council (Article 11.2, and 3).  
 
What is striking from our theoretical perspective of interstitial institutional change is that the 
existing formal rules constitute ambiguous terms of contract, which in the situation of a 
decision stalemate - were re-bargained and transformed so as to overcome the impasse. By so 
doing, the power of the Commission was clearly strengthened.  
 
However, renewed conflicts emerged in the further application of the transformed 
institutional rule. The EP considers that the compromise solution does not work out well and 
it does not feel fairly treated by the Commission. It states in its resolution of 2013: the EP “… 
notes with deep regret a lack of equal treatment of the co-legislators in this process, as the 
Commission reportedly consulted the relevant working group of the Council.” More 
specifically in November 2012 the Commission added a new financial sector indicator on the 
growth rate of financial sector liabilities to the original set of indicators. The EP welcomed 
this addition and had in fact asked for it in December 2011. However, they accused the 
Commission of not having respected the Six-pack rules requiring that the Commission should 
propose suggestions for comment to the EP and the Council when establishing and adjusting 
indicators and thresholds. The EP argued that it had not been properly consulted.  To make 
matters worse, the EP accused the Commission of having consulted the Council at the 
technical level through the EcoFin Council. In short, as the chair of the Economic and 
Monetary Affairs Committee of the EP concluded in the Parliamentary Debate on this issue 
“…the message seems not to have quite trickled through yet to the relevant Commission 
services that Parliament has equal rights with the Council here.” (Sharon Bowles, 
Parliamentary Debate 18.4.2013)
18
. The Commission responded by affirming that it had acted 
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in accordance with the relevant Regulation and in pursuit of a political agreement with the 
Council and Parliament of 2011 for completion of a scoreboard with an eleventh indicator...: 
‘The Commission shall assess on a regular basis the appropriateness of the scoreboard, 
including the composition of indicators, the thresholds set and the methodology used, and it 
shall adjust or modify them where necessary.’ It emphasized that there had been close 
cooperation with the Council and Parliament, as mentioned in the modified new institutional 
rule (Recital 12). It argued that the Commission had treated the EP and the Council in the 
same way and informed them at the same time since the Commission had taken into account 
the views provided by the EP’s Economic Policy Committee which has a mandate to ‘provide 
advice to the Commission’.19  
 
This on-going struggle about the correct application of the already modified institutional rule 
(Recital 12) shows that this interstitial rule, in turn, proves to be incomplete and offers 
opportunities for the actors involved to assert the relative institutional power over how to 
apply the modified rule in a specific case.  
 
 
Case two: Financial Instruments External Relations: Pre-accession IPA II 
In December 2011, the European Commission (EC) published the “Global Europe” 
Communication and a package of proposals for EU instruments for external action for the 
2014-20 period. The instruments are set in the context of the recently agreed Multiannual 
Financial Framework (MFF) 2014-20, under its heading 4 with resources of €66.3 billion, or 
6.12% of the total. This is a 3% increase on the previous MFF, but 16% less than the EC’s 
initial proposal. The main legal basis for the instruments for external action are Articles 
209(1) TFEU (development cooperation programmes) and 212(2) TFEU (economic, financial 
and technical cooperation with other third countries). The agreement on the MFF is 
applicable from 1 January 2014. 
The legislative package comprises nine geographic and thematic instruments, and a hori-
zontal regulation defining common implementing rules for six of them: Instrument for Pre-
accession Assistance (IPA II); European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI); Partnership 
Instrument for cooperation with third countries (PI); Development Cooperation Instrument 
(DCI); Instrument for the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR); Instrument 
contributing to Stability and Peace (IPS)
20
. 
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20
 As a result of the inter-institutional negotiations, Commission's original proposal for the title (Instrument for 
Stability, IPS) was changed to Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IPS). 
Under the Lisbon Treaty, External Relations have been subject to the ordinary legislative 
procedure (co-decision) for the first time, hence implying new powers for the EP. As a 
consequence, in negotiating the specifics of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU in their application 
to External Relations, all actors, i.e. the Commission, the Council or the member states and 
the EP were treading on institutionally new ground and very cautiously negotiated the 
specifics of the application of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU to the Financial Instruments of 
External Relations.
21
 As we argued in the theoretical section: we assume that all actors are 
intent on maximizing their institutional power in order to have influence over policy 
outcomes. Hence we proposed that “An incomplete institutional rule may lead to an 
interstitial institutional change in the course of its application. In the renegotiation of the 
incomplete institutional rule, the preferences of the most powerful actors will be reflected in 
the substance of the newly modified institutional rule.”  
How is this proposition reflected in the empirical story
22
 of the application of Articles 290 
and 291 TFEU in the case of the financial instruments external relations?
23
  
 
The Common Implementing Rule: 
The Commission proposed a common implementing regulation, i.e. a horizontal regulation 
defining common, simplified rules and procedures for all external action instruments. The 
Commission’s financing decisions will take the form of action programmes based on 
multiannual programming documents. Moreover, the Commission may set specific rules for 
some instruments (e.g. IPA II). The regulation also sets out the conditions for access to 
assistance. The common regulation and each instrument will be reviewed at the end of 2017. 
 
In the political decision making process on the common implementing regulation, the 
Common Rule was negotiated at a high level among the Chair of Parliament’s Foreign 
Affairs Committee, the Council presidency (Coreper ambassador), and the Commission. The 
Council proposed not to use delegated acts (Article 290 TFEU) while the EP insisted they 
were used. In other words, it asked for all the Commission's strategic papers for individual 
countries (valid for seven years) to be subject to delegated acts under Article 290 TFEU. It 
argued that strategic choices on important objectives for specific countries would be defined 
in this implementation phase. This, the EP argued, constitutes a political process in which the 
EP (and the Council) should be involved. It further stressed that, given the seven year 
commitment, the EP and the Council as co-legislators should be able to make a mid-term 
reflection on these priorities at, i.e. after three and a half years. By this time, circumstances 
could have changed and therefore priorities would have to be reconsidered. It also argued that 
the outgoing EP should not commit the future EP members for seven years without allowing 
them to make an intermittent review. 
 
Both the Commission and the Council rejected the EP’s request and the Commission 
emphasized that pure implementation issues were at stake. After one and a half years of 
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 We would like to thank Ricardo Rodrigues for collecting documentary materials on this case. 
negotiations, a compromise was struck at the end of 2013. The EP had to renounce its request 
to use delegated acts for all strategic papers. But it was conceded that delegated acts can be 
used in the annexes or in the text of the instrument itself when thematic priorities should be 
changed. In a mid-term review in 2017, the Commission will need to inform the EP and the 
Council on the state of affairs. And, crucially, any potential change of thematic priorities 
during the mid-term review will be subject to a so-called “amending delegated act” as 
opposed to a “self-standing delegated act”. In formulating such a decision and in accordance 
with the inter-institutional framework agreement, EP representatives are invited by the 
Commission to informally give their views on the draft. 
 
In conclusion, renewed negotiations took place in view of the ambiguity of how Articles 290 
and 291 TFEU should be employed in the case of the Financial Instruments External 
Relations Common Rule. In these negotiations a compromise was struck between the 
Commission and Council on the one hand and the EP on the other in which all involved 
actors made concessions. The outcome was the emergence of a new type of delegated act, i.e. 
the “amending delegated act” in the mid-term review of the objectives/thematic priorities of 
individual beneficiary countries.  
Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II) 
More specifically, Council Regulation EC No 1085/2006 assistance expired at the end of 
2013 in the case of the individual financial instrument Pre-accession Assistance IPA II which 
is part of the Budget for Europe 2020,. The framework for planning and delivering external 
assistance, in this case of external assistance for enlargement, is to be continued in the future. 
This is dependent on specific conditions: an applicant state can only become a member when 
it meets the membership criteria agreed upon in Copenhagen in 1993. These criteria include 
the stability of democratic institutions, the rule of law, human rights and respect and 
protection of minorities, and the existence of a functioning market economy. Candidate status 
(as of February 2014) has been granted to Iceland, Montenegro, Macedonia, Turkey and 
Serbia.  
Assistance will be provided on the basis of country or multi-country indicative strategy 
papers of a duration of 7 years as part of the multiannual framework (Article 6). Progress in 
the achievement of specific objectives will be monitored and assessed (Article 2). The 
Commission makes annual assessments of the implementation of the strategic papers, informs 
and, if deemed necessary, sends proposed revisions to the IPA II committee consisting of 
representatives of the member states, chaired by the Commission (Articles 6 and 12). If 
considered necessary, there will also be a mid term review and possibly revision of the 
strategic papers at mid-term (Article 6.4).  
In order to take account of changes in beneficiary countries, the Commission was given the 
power to adopt acts under Article 290 TFEU so that the thematic priorities for assistance 
listed in Annex II can be adapted and updated.
24
 The implementation of the Regulation will 
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 Regulation EU No/….2014, IPA II, Article 10. 
be exercised in accordance with Regulation EU No 182/2011 of the EP and the Council under 
Article 291 TFEU. They will be adopted through an examination procedure unless they are 
technical measures involving low-level finances (Article 11a).  
The essential provisions of IPA II described above are the outcome of inter-institutional 
negotiations between the Commission, the Council and the EP; as pointed out above, for the 
first time this has been subject to the ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision)
25
. Initially, 
the Commission proposed a common strategy framework for all types of action of assistance 
to all countries under pre-accession assistance which was to be subject to implementing acts 
under Article 291 TFEU. The EP opposed this on the grounds that this common strategy 
framework should be subject to a stand-alone delegated act under Article 290 TFEU. The 
amendments of the EP were rejected by both the Council and the Commission. In response, 
the EP offered to renounce delegated acts in the case of individual strategic papers but 
insisted on their requirement under the common strategy framework. This request was also 
rejected by the Council. The resulting deadlock in the decision-making process was 
overcome by deleting the proposal of a common strategy framework altogether. As a result, 
IPA II has only two levels of rules and no middle layer: the Regulation itself and the strategic 
papers describing the actions for individual countries. 
In the case of strategic papers for individual pre-accession countries, the EP reintroduced its 
request to use delegated acts under Article 290 TFEU. The Council opposed the EP’s 
proposals to the very last and only made some concessions briefly before all instruments 
expired in December 2013. 
26
 There was considerable political pressure resting on all actors 
involved to come to an agreement before the expiry of the instruments as well as to ensure 
that programming in beneficiary countries could start on time (or continue). In the end, a 
compromise was found by introducing an “amending delegated act” with regard to Annex II. 
More specifically, the EP ensured that Annex II of the Regulation, which contains a list of 
overall thematic priorities, can be amended by a mid-term “amending delegated act” if 
developments so require. In sum, the EP had to renounce its request to use delegated acts for 
all strategic papers, i.e. the common strategy paper, which was entirely dropped, but in return 
it was conceded that an “amending delegated act” can be used in the redefinition of thematic 
priorities in Annex II. 
Moreover, while the EP had to renounce the use of stand-alone delegated acts with respect to 
strategic papers, it was also granted that a Strategic Dialogue be conducted with the 
Commission. This constitutes a political (as opposed to legal) obligation by the Commission. 
Under the Strategic Dialogue, in the preparation of strategic papers the Commission has the 
political obligation to take the EP’s position into account when it is engaged in the 
programming process with beneficiary countries. This should allow the EP to hold the 
Commission accountable when formulating and implementing agreements with beneficiary 
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countries. “..The Commission will conduct a strategic dialogue with the EP prior to the 
programming of …((financial instrument external relations…))..(It) will present to the 
Parliament the relevant available documents on programming with indicative allocations 
foreseen per country/region….The Commission will present to the Parliament the relevant 
available documents on programming with thematic priorities, possible results, choice of 
assessing modalities, and financial allocations for such priorities foreseen in thematic 
programmes. The Commission will take into account the position expressed by the EP on the 
matter. The Commission conducts a strategic dialogue with the EP in preparing the Mid Term 
Review and before any substantial revision of the programming documents during the period 
of validity of this Regulation.” (Commission Declaration to the Legislative Resolution).  
 
To conclude, in view of the ambiguity of how Articles 290 and 291 TFEU should be 
employed in the case of the Financial Instruments IPA II, a compromise was struck in the 
negotiation process  between the Commission and both the Council and the EP in which all 
actors involved made concessions. The institutional outcomes were the emergence of a new 
type of delegated act, i.e. the “amending delegated act” in the mid-term review of the 
thematic priorities of individual beneficiary countries and the introduction of the Strategic 
Dialogue between the Commission and the EP.  
 
 
3.2 The contest of power between the Commission and national parliaments 
 
In the next two case studies, we focus not only on the Commission, the Council and the EP, 
but also on additional institutional players, namely the national parliaments. This new actor 
became involved in the contest of how to apply delegated rule-making through the 
subsidiarity review procedure in Protocol No 2 to the Lisbon Treaty. As part of this 
procedure, a national parliament may issue a reasoned opinion within eight weeks from the 
date of transmission of a draft legislative act, stating why it considers that the draft in 
question does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity.
27
 Each national parliament is 
equipped with two votes; in the case of a bicameral parliament, each of the two chambers has 
one vote.
28
 If the number of issued reasoned opinions represents at least one-third of all the 
votes allocated to the national parliaments, or one-fourth of these votes in case of proposals in 
the area of freedom, security and justice, the Commission has to review its proposal and may 
consequently decide to maintain, amend or withdraw the proposal.
29
 The jargon for this 
procedure is the ‘yellow card’. Moreover, national parliaments may trigger an ‘orange card’ 
under the ordinary legislative procedure, if the reasoned opinions account for at least a simple 
majority of the votes allocated to national parliaments.
30
 Again, the Commission reviews its 
proposal and may decide to maintain, amend or withdraw it. If it is maintained, the Council 
(55% majority) or the EP (majority of the votes cast) may stop the legislative procedure. 
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The reasoned opinions of national parliaments not only assess the subsidiarity principle, but 
also other elements of the Commission proposals, and therefore go beyond the strict wording 
of Protocol No.2.
31
 One of the elements of Commission proposals that national parliaments 
take into account in their reasoned opinions are the delegations to adopt delegated or 
implementing acts. Hence, in the following two case studies we analyse first the reaction of 
national parliaments to the delegations included in the Commission proposals for the new 
data protection legislation and new tobacco products directive. Next, we look at the 
willingness of the Commission to take the opinions of parliaments into account. Both case 
studies examine the preferences of the Commission, Council and the EP for legislation or 
delegation of power, yet the legislative procedure in the case of the data protection proposal 
is still underway. Subsequently, within delegation, we look at the choice between delegated 
and implementing powers. We also inquire into the extent of delegation preferred by different 
actors. Finally, we identify the outcomes of the choice of rule, legislation or delegation, 
delegated act or implementing act and compare them to the original preferences of the 
national parliaments. 
Based on the assumption made above that actors choose the institutional rule that maximises 
their institutional power in order to wield the highest possible influence on policy outcomes, 
we indicate the following situational preferences that actors hold in these cases. For the 
purpose of these case studies, we treat parliamentary chambers as unified actors with a 
preference for legislation, and if delegation is chosen, for delegated acts (Article 290).  
National parliaments will prefer legislation, because it allows for the greatest control over the 
outcome. More specifically, the Lisbon Treaty granted national parliaments new powers in 
the EU legislative procedure, but no competences under Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. These 
provisions empower the Commission to the greatest extent; hence, as argued above, we 
assume that the Commission’s preference is for extensive delegation. The EP will favour 
legislation over delegation as it can shape the basic legislative act more than delegated or 
implementing acts. Under delegation, it can only revoke or object to the delegation with 
regard to delegated acts. Finally, we assume that the Council will choose delegation, and in 
the context of delegation will prefer implementing acts, as it provides representatives of the 
member states with influence in the committees.  
Case 3: Data Protection Legislation 
In January 2012, the Commission proposed a new legal framework for the protection of 
personal data in order to reinforce the individual’s fundamental right to data protection.32 The 
proposal consists of a directive
33
 and General Data Protection Regulation.
34
 Both draft acts 
contain a considerable number of delegations to adopt delegated and implementing acts.
35
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 Communication from the Commission, Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World. A European Data 
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 Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, 
National parliaments scrutinised both proposals within the subsidiarity review procedure. As 
a result, the Belgian Chambre des Représentants, the French Sénat and the Italian Camera 
dei Deputati issued a reasoned opinion on the proposed regulation, while the German 
Bundesrat and the Swedish Riksdag issued an opinion on both the regulation and the 
directive. Especially the reasoned opinions related to the draft regulation criticised the use of 
delegated and implementing acts by the Commission, among other issues. 
The most important criticism concerned the large number of delegations
36
 allowing for 
‘practically full authority to adopt delegated acts relating to almost every one of the most 
important elements’ of the proposal.37 In the view of the German Bundesrat, the amount of 
delegated acts goes beyond Article 16(2) TFEU, which provides that a comprehensive 
regulation of data protection can only be made by the EU legislator.
38
 Along similar lines, the 
Swedish Riksdag argued that the consequence of the transferred powers is that the 
Commission has been given a legislative role replacing legislators and courts.
39
 In the same 
vein, the Belgian Chambre des Représentants favoured a comprehensive regulation instead of 
the use of executive acts, in order to ensure the participation of all institutions, the Parliament 
and the Council.
40
 Finally, the French Sénat distinguished between issues which demand 
regulation by the EU legislator (eg ‘the right to be forgotten’ expressed in Article 17 of the 
proposal) and other issues to be decided at the national level.
41
 
In line with the Commission's preference for delegation, it replied that delegations by means 
of delegated acts do not concern any essential element of the act proposed and that the 
duration of their validity is limited.
42
 Moreover, the Commission's reply to the German 
Bundesrat and the Belgian Chambre des Représentants also maintained that more detailed 
rules instead of delegated acts ‘would result in an inflexible and unwieldy legal text which 
would not be open to innovation and new technologies.’ In the Commission’s view, the 
regulation was ‘deliberately drafted as a technologically neutral legal instrument,’ ‘to 
anticipate all technological developments of the next twenty years,’ so the regulation can be 
supplemented without resorting to a revision of the regulation itself in every case.
43
 As to 
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 Commission reply to the Italian Camera dei Deputati, 21.02.2013. 
delegation under implementing acts, the Commission explained that it has been proposed for 
the technical and practical aspects which demand uniform implementation.
44
 
During the first reading of the proposal, the EP did not mention the points raised by national 
parliaments with regard to delegated rule-making directly. For example, with regard to the 
delegated acts concerning the right to be forgotten, a problem raised by the French chamber, 
the EP added that the Commission may adopt delegated acts in this respect, ‘after requesting 
an opinion of the European Data Protection Board.’45 Similar rule was included with regard 
to the adoption of implementing acts by the Commission expressed in Article 62 of the 
proposal on the consistency mechanism. Whilst during the debate on the proposal, only one 
MEP raised the issue of the number of delegated acts,
46
 in line with the EP’s preference for 
legislation the EP decreased the number of delegations by means of delegated acts in the 
proposal (out of 26 delegations remained six and a number of delegations by means of 
implementing acts was changed into delegated ones).
47
 Also in line with the EP’s preference 
for delegated acts within the delegated rule-making, the number of delegations to adopt 
implementing acts has been drastically decreased (out of 22 only one remained). 
In its most recent position, the Council deleted delegation by means of delegated acts in the 
cases mentioned by national parliament’s reasoned opinions; with regard to the right to be 
forgotten and some of the delegations by means of implementing acts in Article 62 of the 
proposal.
48
 Yet the Council did not acknowledge any role of the reasoned opinions of 
national parliaments in this regard. In general, following its preference for delegation the 
Council’s position left more of the dispositions for delegated and implementing act than the 
first reading of the EP (out of 22 delegations by means of implementing acts remained nine 
and out of 26 delegations by means of delegated acts six were left). 
In conclusion, this case shows that national parliaments became new actors in delegated rule 
making due to the ambiguity in the application of Article 290 and 291 TFEU, and 
consequently attempted to influence delegation. However, national parliaments play a very 
limited role because they may only react within the subsidiarity review procedure. Moreover, 
under Protocol No. 2, the Commission is not obliged to introduce changes in its proposal 
unless required by the EP and the Council within the ‘orange card’ procedure. Finally, the 
preference of the Commission for delegation over legislation reduced the chances national 
parliaments being able to change the delegations. It seems however, that the concern of 
national parliaments about the total number of delegations is shared by the EP and the 
Council and it remains to be seen whether the final act will maintain this approach. 
Case 4: Tobacco Directive 
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The Tobacco Directive case focuses on a new tobacco products directive that updates and 
replaces the current legislation in this field.
49
 The novelty of the Commission proposal 
concerns issues such as enlarging the size and the position of health warnings, prohibition of 
flavourings, ban on slim cigarettes and the regulation of e-cigarettes.
50
 
The legal basis of the proposal is Article 114 TFEU, which demands the ordinary legislative 
procedure for approximation of laws of member states for the establishment and functioning 
of the internal market. Accordingly, in June 2013 the Council issued a general approach
51
 and 
the EP voted on the amendments to the proposal in October 2013.
52
 After five trilogues, the 
institutions approved the text of the directive in December 2013 with a view to an agreement 
on this legislative proposal at first reading.
53
 In March 2014 the Tobacco directive has been 
finally adopted.
54
 
The issue at stake is the large number of provisions empowering the Commission to adopt 
delegated (22) and implementing acts (4) incorporated in the Commission proposal.
55
 The 
most important delegations based on delegated acts related to, firstly, the adaptation of 
standards for the maximum yields of ingredients and their measurement methods in 
accordance with scientific development and international standards. A second type of 
delegation aimed at setting maximum levels of additives that produce a characterising 
flavour. The third type of delegation referred to adapting the wording and the form of health 
warnings to scientific and market developments. Finally, with regard to e-cigarettes, the 
proposal conferred the Commission with the power to update the quantities of nicotine and 
the health warnings on these products by means of delegated acts. 
With regard to implementing acts, the Commission proposed delegations to set and update 
the format for the submission of information by manufacturers and producers on ingredients 
and emissions of tobacco products and the dissemination of this information by member 
states. Moreover, the Commission was given power to adopt uniform rules by means of 
implementing acts to determine whether a tobacco product has a characterising flavour and 
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whether a tobacco product contains additives that increase its toxic or addictive effects at the 
stage of consumption. 
Several national parliaments reacted critically to the Commission’s directive proposal within 
the subsidiarity review procedure under Protocol No.2. Nine parliamentary chambers in total 
issued a reasoned opinion stating a violation of the subsidiarity principle: the Portuguese 
Assembleia da República, the Danish Folketing, the Hellenic Vouli ton Ellinon, the Swedish 
Riksdag, the Bulgarian Narodno sabranie, the Czech Poslanecká sněmovna, the Italian 
Senato and Camera dei Deputati and the Romanian Camera Deputailor.
56
  
Even though the procedure under Protocol No. 2 concerns only the scrutiny of the 
subsidiarity principle, the ambiguity in the rules regarding the exercise of delegated powers 
enshrined in Article 290 TFEU prompted a strong reaction from national parliaments.
57
 The 
implemented acts seemed less problematic;
58
 this is due to the fact that the Commission is 
assisted in the shaping of implementing acts by the committees composed of representatives 
of the member states. Therefore, the attention of national parliaments focused on delegated 
acts, under which the Council and the EP have ‘only’ an ex post right of objection and 
revocation. The Greek Vouli ton Ellinon, the Italian Senato, the Czech Poslanecká sněmovna 
and the Bulgarian Narodno sabranie claimed that the proposal empowers the Commission to 
adopt delegated acts with regard to essential elements of the proposal.
59
 Thus, the Bulgarian 
parliament disputed the application of delegated acts concerning the maximum tar, nicotine, 
carbon monoxide and other yields, regulation of ingredients, health warnings and appearance 
and content of unit packets.
60
 In addition to the points raised by the Bulgarian chamber, the 
Italian Senato criticised delegations with regard to the e-cigarette. 
Besides the delegation of essential elements, national parliaments criticised the large number 
of empowerments to adopt delegated acts within one legislative act. The Czech, Hellenic, 
Romanian and Italian chambers objected to the fact that the Commission proposal provided 
for such an extensive transfer of powers to the Commission to adopt non-legislative acts on 
substantial provisions within one act.
61
 Additionally, the Bulgarian parliament and the Italian 
Senato objected to the unlimited duration of the empowerment to adopt delegated acts. 
In their reasoned opinions, national parliaments underlined the consequences of such a power 
transfer to the Commission. Accordingly, the Danish Folketing considered the delegations of 
power to be a hurdle for national parliaments when seeking to monitor the compliance of 
proposals with the principle of subsidiarity and the consequences of the directive.
62
 
Additionally, the Italian Senato claimed ‘an excessive and unjustified’ conferral of power on 
the Commission that encroached on the competence of national Parliaments by denying them 
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62
 Reasoned opinion of the Danish Folketing on COM (2012) 788, 4.03.2013, p. 3. 
the possibility to assess the subsidiarity and proportionality of the delegated acts.
63
 Finally, in 
the view of the Bulgarian chamber, the approach presented in the proposed directive deprived 
the Member States of ‘the opportunity to implement a policy tuned to their national 
specificities and societal and cultural differences, in accordance with national health 
policies’.64 
In line with the Commission's preference for delegation, it gave a very succinct reply to the 
concerns of national parliaments rebutting all their arguments against the proposed delegated 
powers.
65
 More specifically, the Commission defended the power to adopt delegated acts as 
necessary in order to make this directive fully operational in the view of technical, scientific 
and international developments in the tobacco manufacture, consumption and regulation.” 
The Commission further maintained that the delegations of power provide for “clear and 
concise criteria, giving limited discretion to the Commission.” Moreover, the Commission 
ensured involvement of the Member States in the preparation of the delegated acts and 
simultaneous transmission of relevant documents to the EP and Council. In sum, due to the 
fact that the subsidiarity procedure does not empower national parliaments to block the 
legislative procedure, the Commission may unilaterally impose the conditions of delegation. 
Consequently, parliament’s role in shaping delegated and implementing acts is limited even 
in cases when they trigger a “yellow card”. 
As to the contest between legislation or delegation, we argued above that under the ordinary 
legislative procedure, the Commission and the Council will prefer delegated powers, whilst 
the European Parliament will opt for legislation. Accordingly, in the case of the directive on 
the tobacco products, the Commission proposed a large number of delegations which 
expressly empower the Commission. The Council also favoured delegations. The EPSCO 
Council’s general approach shows that the Council reduced only two of the delegations by 
means of delegated acts
66
 and added new provisions with delegations.
67
 
In the EP, a number of MEPs raised concerns during the plenary vote on amendments about 
the broad scope of delegated acts envisaged in the Commission proposal and underlined that 
the delegations concerned essential elements of the proposal.
68
 As a result, the EP upheld 
only less than a half of the delegated acts foreseen by the Commission, removing the 
controversial provisions on the characteristic flavourings, shape of unit packets and nicotine-
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 European Parliament, 5. Manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco and related products (debate), 
8.10.2013. 
containing products.
69
 With regard to one delegation, the EP directly regulated details of text 
warnings for tobacco products in the legislative act.
70
 
The final text of the directive shows that the opinions of national parliaments have not been 
shared by the Commission. The views of national parliaments did, however, find some 
support within the EP and the Council in relation to the duration of the delegation. The EU 
legislator proposed that delegations should be limited to five years. As to the mode of 
delegation under delegated acts or implementing acts, only the delegated act on detailed rules 
for the shape and size of unit packets,
71
 to which national parliaments objected, was deleted 
by both the EP and the Council. Nonetheless, we cannot empirically ascertain the influence of 
national parliaments as neither the Council nor the EP referred directly to national 
parliaments as the source of influence for introducing these changes. 
As to the high number of delegations, the EP also opted to limit the number of delegations 
but did not directly invoke the arguments of national parliaments. This specific objection of 
national parliaments did not find support in the Council; the final legislative act contains a 
high number of delegations to adopt delegated acts. This might be due to the fact that 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland and Romania were in the opposing minority in the 
Council and hence their views were not taken into account in the general approach.
72
  
In sum, the text of the directive remained closest to the Commission’s and Council’s 
preference for delegation, whereas the EP’s preference for legislation, expressed in the limits 
placed on the number of delegations, was not generally shared.
73
  
Turning to the choice of a type of delegation that depended on the relative institutional power 
under the two forms of delegation, i.e. delegated or implementing acts, we assumed that the 
EP prefers delegated acts, whereas the Council prefers implementing acts. The general 
approach adopted in the Council introduced a number of amendments concerning delegated 
and implementing powers. As mentioned earlier, with regard to delegated acts, the Council 
removed only two delegations by means of delegated acts in their entirety
74
 and moved 
another to the main body of the directive,
75
 whilst limiting the scope of some other 
delegations. However, the Council did not introduce far-reaching limitations with regard to 
implementing acts. In fact, it advanced two new delegations to adopt implementing acts.
76
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Additionally, as many as four delegations by means of delegated acts were replaced by 
implementing acts.
77
 These changes confirm the Council’s preference for implementing acts. 
Whereas the EP eliminated a very large number of delegations by means of delegated acts, it 
also added one new delegation of this type, namely on the procedure to obtain approval on 
additives by manufacturers and importers.
78
 Meanwhile, it deleted all delegations to adopt 
implementing acts except for one.
79
 These choices of the EP confirm what we have argued 
earlier, namely that within delegation the EP prefers delegated acts.  
Finally, the agreed text of the directive is closest to the preferences of the Council and the 
Commission (for the implementing acts) in that the institutions agreed to change some of the 
delegated acts into implementing ones, and added implementing acts proposed earlier by the 
Council and three new implementing delegations.
80
 A particularly interesting instance 
concerns the procedure for the approval of additives by the Commission. In this regard, the 
EP proposed in the amendments voted in October 2013 that this procedure would be 
established by the Commission by means of delegated acts.
81
 However, the agreement 
reached by the institutions modified the procedure proposed by the EP. The compromise 
solution provides that the Commission may set by means of implementing acts a ‘priority list’ 
of additives allowed in cigarettes and roll-your-own tobacco subjected to re-enforced 
reporting obligation by manufacturers or importers.
82
 
As to the contest about the extent of delegation and as stated earlier, the Council indicates a 
preference for implementing acts whereas the EP chooses delegated acts, thus conforming to 
their comparatively more far-reaching powers in each of the cases. Hence, the Council will be 
more willing to limit the scope of delegations by means of delegated acts and the EP will 
prefer to limit the extent of delegations by means of implementing acts. In the Tobacco case, 
the Council has limited the scope of some delegations by means of delegated acts. For 
example, the Council decided in its general approach that with regard to the nicotine-
containing products, the Commission may only adapt the wording of the health warnings, but 
not their position, format, layout, design and rotation.
83
 In sum, the Council followed its 
institutional preference for limitation of delegated acts as explained above. 
In contrast to the Council, the EP deleted most of the delegations under implementing acts. It 
was only with regard to the labelling of smokeless tobacco products that the EP introduced 
limitations in the scope of delegation similarly to the Council.
84
 Consequently, the 
expectation that the EP will limit the extent of delegations based on implementing acts is 
confirmed by the fact that the EP decided to almost completely eliminate them.  
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Finally, both the Council and the EP proposed that the power to adopt delegated acts should 
be conferred on the Commission for a limited time period of five years, and demanded a 
report from the Commission in respect of the delegation of power nine months before that 
date. This amendment proposed by both institutions is in line with the Common 
Understanding. In sum, the changes in the scope of delegated acts introduced by the Council 
were largely followed in the agreement reached among the institutions. 
To conclude, the existing formal rules in Articles 290 and 291 TFEU constitute ambiguous 
terms of contract and therefore trigger the scrutiny of national parliaments under Protocol No. 
2, originally directed at the review of the subsidiarity principle. Also in the Tobacco case, the 
Commission did not change the delegations in the basic act despite the opinions of national 
parliaments. In the subsequent bargaining over the Commission proposal under the co-
decision procedure, the participating actors followed their institutional preferences. Given the 
choice between legislation and delegation, the Commission opted for delegations whereas the 
Council approved of delegation but limited the scope of delegated acts or proposed 
implementing acts. By contrast, the EP opted for legislation, as manifested in the large 
amounts of deleted delegations. With regard to the choice between delegated acts and 
implementing acts, the Council chose implementing acts and the EP showed a preference for 
delegated acts once delegation was decided upon. Finally, the EP restricted the Commission’s 
power in the remaining delegated acts by limiting the extent of these delegations in line with 
its preference for limiting delegation and using legislation. On the other hand, the Council 
limited delegation under delegated acts in favour of delegation under implementing acts. The 
agreement on the final text reached by the institutions shows that the Commission succeeded 
in keeping the majority of delegations intact. The Council succeeded in changing some of 
them into implementing acts and adding new ones. Compared with the other institutions, the 
EP’s preferences are less reflected in the decision outcomes.  
Finally, as described above, the Commission did not follow the arguments stated in the 
reasoned opinions of national parliaments. In addition, the final text of the directive contains 
a large number of delegations criticised by national parliaments. However, the EU legislators 
decreased the duration of the empowerment to adopt delegated acts in line with the 
expectation of some of the parliaments. Similarly, one of the delegations by means of 
delegated acts to which the national parliaments objected was deleted. Nonetheless, as neither 
the EP nor the Council mention the changes proposed by national parliaments, the role of 
national parliaments in shaping delegated legislation cannot be shown empirically.  
4 Conclusion  
Ever since the Lisbon Treaty introduced the new provisions on delegated rule-making under 
Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, the newly created institutional rules have been subject to change. 
Some of the changes have occurred upfront in the formal political arenas, and have been 
contested by the relevant actors, i.e. Council, European Parliament (EP) and Commission as 
well as national parliaments. By contrast, other changes have occurred in a more covert or 
invisible way, unfolding after the adoption of a formal rule in the course of its application. 
We are focusing on the latter type of ‘interstitial’ institutional change and its consequences 
and ask ‘Under what circumstances does ‘interstitial’ institutional change occur after a formal 
rule has been adopted; what are its dynamics and its consequences?’ 
We define interstitial institutional change as informal institutional change which occurs 
between two formal rule revisions. Institutional change emerges once a formal political 
decision of integration has been taken that constitutes an incomplete contract. This offers the 
possibility of renegotiation and specification in the course of its application. The explanation 
is based on the assumptions of goal-oriented, boundedly rational actors, seeking to maximize 
their institutional power and thereby their power over policy outcomes. We hypothesize that 
An incomplete institutional rule or policy may lead to an interstitial institutional change in 
the course of its application. In the renegotiation of the incomplete institutional rule, the 
preferences of the most powerful actors will be reflected in the substance of the modified 
interstitial institutional rule.” In order to show the plausibility of our argument, we discuss 
four cases of institutional change resulting from ambiguities in institutional rules under 
Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. 
The Lisbon Treaty distinguishes between legislative delegation and executive delegation and 
provides for two separate procedures for “delegated acts” and “implementing acts’. Under 
Article 290 TFEU, the Commission – by legislation – may be delegated the power to adopt 
“delegated acts” of general scope supplementing or amending certain non-essential elements 
of the legislation in question. The legislators must explicitly define the objective, content, 
scope and duration of this delegation. They can also choose the mechanism(s) used to control 
the Commission when it applies these delegated powers, revocation and objection. However, 
the new provisions of the Lisbon Treaty leave unanswered many questions as to how 
delegated acts (Article 290 TFEU) and implementing acts (Article 291 TFEU) should be 
applied. In other words the provisions constitute an incomplete contract.  
 
The first case focuses on the conflict between the Commission, the Council and the EP in the 
definition of the economic indicators under the scoreboard regime under the preventive arm 
of the Prevention and Correction of Macroeconomic Imbalances. Some vague provisions 
were introduced in Regulation on the Prevention and Correction of Macroeconomic 
Imbalances that needed specification through delegated legislation. In the interpretation of 
these incomplete institutional rules, a conflict emerged over the choice of either delegated 
acts (Article 290 TEFU) or implementing acts (Article 291 TFEU). When deciding how to 
flesh out the scoreboard regime, i.e. the indicators used to measure and monitor macro-
economic and macro-financial imbalances, the Commission first proposed to define these 
indicators on its own. When there was resistance from both the Council and the EP, the 
Commission proposed “delegated acts” together with the EP (Article 290 TFEU) whilst the 
Council wished to use an implementing act (Article 291 TFEU). A deadlock ensued which, 
after a round of negotiations, led to the use of an informal new type of procedure which is 
neither Article 290 TFEU nor Article 291 TFEU, the “compromise”. What emerges from our 
theoretical perspective of interstitial institutional change is that the existing formal rules 
constitute ambiguous terms of contract, which in the situation of a decision stalemate - were 
re-bargained and transformed in such a way as to overcome the impasse. By so doing, the 
power of the Commission was clearly strengthened.  
In the further application of the new institutional rule, it emerged however that the EP did not 
feel fairly treated by the Commission.  This on-going struggle about the correct application of 
– in this case – already modified interstitial institutional rule (Recital 12) shows that the 
modified rule is in turn incomplete and offers opportunities to assert the relative institutional 
power of the actors involved, i.e. about how to apply the modified rule in a specific case.  
The second case “Financial Instruments External Relations: Pre-accession IPA II,” refers to 
the issue that, under the Lisbon Treaty, External Relations were subject for the first time to 
the ordinary legislative procedure (previously the co-decision procedure), hence implying 
new powers for the EP. Consequently, in negotiating the specifics of Articles 290 and 291 
TFEU in their application to External Relations all actors, the Commission, the Council or the 
member states and the EP were treading on institutionally new territory and very cautiously 
negotiated the specifics of the application of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU to the Financial 
Instruments of External Relations. Renewed negotiations took place in view of the ambiguity 
of how Articles 290 and 291 TFEU should be employed in the case of the Financial 
Instruments External Relations Common Rule. The EP wished to employ delegated acts, 
while the Commission and the Council opted for implementing acts. In these negotiations, a 
compromise was struck in which all involved actors made concessions. The outcome was the 
emergence of a new type of delegated act, i.e. the “amending delegated act” in the mid-term 
review of the objectives/thematic priorities of individual beneficiary countries as well as a 
strategic dialogue between the Commission and the EP when defining strategic papers for 
individual member states.  
The third case concerns the legislation (a directive and a regulation) proposed by the 
Commission on data protection. Especially the draft regulation contained a large number of 
delegations that empowered the Commission. In view of the ambiguity in the application of 
Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, national parliaments became new actors in delegated law 
making. Namely, national parliaments reacted to these proposals under the subsidiarity 
review mechanism introduced by Lisbon Treaty, overriding the strict wording of Protocol 
No.2 which demands a focus on the principle of subsidiarity violations. Their reasoned 
opinions highlighted the fact that the Commission proposals contain numerous delegations 
with far-reaching scope. Moreover, national parliaments signalled that these delegations grant 
the Commission far-reaching authority to adopt delegated acts with regard to the most 
important elements of this legislation.  
 
As the number of opinions issued by national parliaments did not reach the “yellow” or 
“orange card” threshold, the Commission was not obliged to take any further steps to review 
its proposal. In its responses to national parliaments, the Commission rejected the arguments 
raised by national parliaments in line with its preference for delegation. In particular, the 
Commission replied that the delegations by means of delegated acts do not concern any 
essential element of the act proposed and that their period of validity is limited, allowing for 
more flexibility and openness to innovation and new technologies.  
The fourth case concerns the new tobacco directive and like the third case focuses on national 
parliaments as a new player in delegated law-making. With regard to the Commission 
proposal for a new tobacco directive, national parliaments criticised the large number of 
empowerments to adopt delegated acts within one legislative act, often concerning essential 
elements of the directive, as well as the unlimited duration of these delegations. However, as 
in the case of data protection, the Commission remained firm on its position and rebutted the 
arguments of national parliament. In the subsequent bargaining over the Commission 
proposal under the co-decision procedure, the participating actors followed their institutional 
preferences. The preferences for delegation of the Commission and of the Council  are taken 
most into account in the adopted text. The directive further contains a large number of 
delegations, which was one of the critical points raised by national parliaments. However, the 
EU legislator limited the duration of the empowerment to adopt delegated acts and deleted 
one of the delegations in accordance with the reasoned opinions of national parliaments. 
Hence, national parliaments have played some role in the delegated legislation in the tobacco 
case, but we cannot empirically show the impact of national parliaments as the EP and the 
Council have not acknowledged it formally. 
In conclusion, the comparison of the four cases shows that the EP had real blocking power in 
the decision-making process in the first two cases and consequently was able to force the 
Commission and the Council to offer some concessions and obtain a modification of 
delegation rules in its favour. Given the conflicting preferences of the other two institutional 
actors, it did not achieve what it requested, i.e. the use of delegation acts, but it attained 
modified institutional rules of delegation in each case: the compromise rule in the case of 
Excessive Macro Economic Imbalances, and the amending delegated rule in the case of 
external relations. 
 
By contrast, the national parliaments had no formal blocking power of a Commission 
decision draft and did not obtain any concessions from the Commission. Only with the 
support of one of the other European level institutional actors could it have wielded more 
leverage, as in the case of some issues highlighted by national parliaments in the tobacco 
directive. 
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